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 Bid Preference Programs and Participation
 in Highway Procurement Auctions1
 By  Elena Krasnokutskaya and Katja Seim*
 We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to
 California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect
 of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on
 an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions,
 which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative
 policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses
 significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies.
 IJEL D44, H76, R42)
 Public-sector procurement accounts for over 10 percent of US GDP. Across levels
 of government, preferential treatment programs are extensively used in procurement
 auctions. For example, in 2006, the federal government awarded 20 percent of its
 procurement dollars to favored firms.1 One commonly used preference mechanism,
 a bid discount or credit, improves the bids of favored firms by a preestablished rate
 when determining the winner but uses the actual amount of the winner's bid in the
 contract.2 Prominent examples include a 25 percent bid credit granted to small firms
 in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions and a 50 percent
 bid penalty added to foreign bids on defense contracts.3 The aim of this paper is to
 improve our understanding of the effects of such preference programs on the gov
 ernment's cost of procurement and the distribution of profits between participants,
 as well as to provide an assessment of the likely magnitudes of these effects in prac
 tice. We do so empirically in the context of the California Small Business Preference
 program that grants small firms a 5 percent bid discount.4
 * Krasnokutskaya: Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD
 21218 (e-mail: ekrasnol@jhu.edu); Seim: University of Pennsylvania, Department of Business and Public Policy,
 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: kseim@wharton.upenn.edu). We gratefully acknowledge the
 comments and suggestions of three anonymous referees, Susan Athey, Phil Haile, Philip Leslie, Tong Li, Ariel
 Pakes, Petra Todd, Brian Viard, Joel Waldfogel, Ken Wolpin, and participants at various conferences and seminars.
 We thank Christine Inouye and Steven Tolle for making the data available. Cristina Fuentesa and Karam Kang
 provided excellent research assistance.
 t To view additional materials, visit the article page at
 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer. 101.6.2653.
 1 See the Federal Procurement Report 2007, available at https://www.fpds.gov/.
 2With a 10 percent bid discount, for example, a bid by a favored firm of $440,000 is treated as a bid of $400,000
 in comparing it to the remaining, nonfavored, firms' bids. If the favored firm wins, its payment is the original
 amount of the bid, or $440,000.
 3 See "Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission's
 Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures," WT Docket No. 05-211, Second Report and Order and Second Further
 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Red 4753, 4766 par 36 (2006); and the Department of Defense's "Defense
 Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement," Part 225: Foreign Acquisition (2008), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/.
 4 Other empirical studies of preference programs include Justin Marion (2007,2009) who finds two specific pref
 erence programs to be costly to governments; Thomas A. Denes (1997) who provides evidence of cost decreases in
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 The stated goal of most preference programs is to facilitate the integration of
 favored participants into the marketplace. These are often groups historically dis
 criminated against, or groups considered disadvantaged due to entry barriers, or
 both. They are also often considered to be less cost efficient. As preference programs
 result in such high-cost companies performing a larger share of work, one may
 expect the cost of procurement to increase. At the same time, however, these pro
 grams also provide incentives to nonfavored firms to bid more aggressively against
 the strengthened favored group, which mitigates the upward pressure on the cost of
 procurement. For some discount levels, this last effect is sufficiently strong for the
 cost of procurement to actually decrease (R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan
 1989 and Allan Corns and Andrew Schotter 1999 show this theoretically and in
 experiments, respectively, for assumed numbers of bidders and cost distributions).
 The key insight of this paper is that there is a third effect neglected in the litera
 ture. Bid preference programs have potentially strong effects on firms' incentives to
 participate in an auction. We show that accounting for a response in participation
 behavior significantly alters the assessment of the preference program's cost to the
 government and its distributional effects. While it continues to be possible to use bid
 discounts to lower the cost of procurement as in McAfee and McMillan (1989), both
 the cost-minimizing level of the discount and the group receiving the discount may
 change when participation effects are taken into account. The currently accepted
 practice of evaluating bid preference programs holding participation fixed can yield
 very misleading results.
 The theoretical literature suggests that the magnitudes of the program's effects
 crucially depend on the degree of cost asymmetries between favored and other bid
 ders. We thus base our analysis on empirically relevant distributions of firm costs
 recovered from data on highway procurement auctions that were awarded under a
 bid preference program. We use a model of firms' participation and bidding deci
 sions in the presence of a bid discount.5 The firm's decision of which bid to submit
 reflects its private information about its cost of completing the project, which we
 term "project cost," and the distributions of its competitors' project costs. The par
 ticipation decision instead is based on a comparison of the cost of preparing the bid,
 or entry cost, to the expected profit from participation. Only firms with entry costs
 below the expected profit ultimately submit a bid in the auction. We use this model
 to uncover the underlying distributions of firms' entry and project costs consistent
 with observed choices.
 The nature and importance of our findings can be seen from Figure 1 that plots
 changes in the government's cost of procurement relative to no discrimination at
 different levels of the bid discount for a typical project in our data.6 We contrast the
 some set-aside auctions for dredging work; and Ian Ayres and Peter Cramton (1996) who argue that preference pro
 grams yielded significant revenue increases in a small sample of FCC spectrum auctions. These papers use descrip
 tive methods, which allow them to measure the effects of the current programs, but do not permit an evaluation of
 alternative program designs. Francesco Decarolis (2010) analyzes average price auctions that could be interpreted
 as an extreme form of preference policy where the bid closest to the average wins and the high bid is eliminated.
 5 Our analysis also contributes to a small but growing literature that empirically studies the decision to participate
 in auctions. Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin, and Enrique Seira (2011), Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu (2003), Tong
 Li (2005), and Li and Xiaoyong Zheng (2009) represent recent contributions to this literature.
 6The project's cost distributions are representative of approximately 30 percent of projects. The remaining proj
 ects are discussed in the main body of the paper.
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 Bid discount
 to large firms
 Bid discount
 to small firms
 Cost of procurement  Small firms' probability of winning
 Figure 1. Cost of Procurement and Probability of Winning under Fixed
 and Endogenous Participation, Sample Project
 cost of procurement implied by a model that does not allow firms to respond to the
 discount in their participation behavior with one where participation adjusts endog
 enously. Several patterns emerge:
 (i) Under fixed participation, the cost of procurement varies only by a limited
 amount as the discount changes from 50 percent to large bidders (the leftmost
 point in the figure) to 50 percent to small bidders (the rightmost point). The
 cost of procurement exhibits significantly more variation when we take par
 ticipation effects into account.
 (ii) The implications for policy design differ significantly in the two cases. To
 minimize the cost of procurement, the model with fixed participation pre
 scribes a discount of approximately 20 percent to small bidders. Relaxing
 the assumption of fixed participation suggests that offering such a discount to
 small bidders would actually increase the cost of procurement. Instead, a dis
 count of 50 percent should be offered to large bidders to achieve substantial
 cost savings.
 (iii) California's Small Business Preference program aims to allocate 25 percent
 of procurement dollars to small firms, which we refer to as the program's
 "allocative goal." The fixed participation model implies that the small-firm
 discount required to achieve this goal is more than 50 percent for this par
 ticular project. This model predicts that such a discount yields a 0.23 per
 cent increase in procurement cost. However, a model that takes participation
 adjustments into account would recognize that this substantial discount deters
 large-firm participation and, therefore, that the true cost increase would be
 7.8 percent. Additionally, preferential treatment increases small-firm partici
 pation and in turn the group's probability of winning; hence, a bid discount
 of only approximately 20 percent is sufficient to achieve the allocative goal,
 raising the government's cost by 3.2 percent.
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 This example is based on a particular, albeit common, type of project in our data.
 An aggregate evaluation of California's preference policy needs to take into account
 heterogeneity in project characteristics and the competitive environment, which
 introduces heterogeneity in the effectiveness of a bid discount across projects. Our
 empirical results suggest significant differences in the degree of cost asymmetries
 between large and small firms across projects. For an important subset of projects in
 our data, we recover cost distributions for large and small firms that are very similar.
 As a result, small-firm participation and winning rates for these projects are high
 even in the absence of a bid discount. Because of the particular mix of projects, the
 aggregate cost of procurement at a discount level that awards 25 percent of procure
 ment dollars to small firms is only 1.4 percent higher than the aggregate cost under
 no preferential treatment. It is important to note, however, that this result is specific
 to the California market. In other markets where the composition of projects is dif
 ferent, the cost of bid preference programs may be very different.
 For California's current program, which uses a relatively low discount level of
 5 percent, we find that the cost of procurement is within 1.5 percent of the cost
 of procurement in the absence of discrimination. However, the program induces
 substantial changes in small and large firms' participation and probabilities of win
 ning. It results in a redistribution of 5 to 12 percent of profits from large to small
 firms for typical projects that differ in type of work, location, and size. At the same
 time the program does not achieve its goal of allocating 25 percent of procurement
 dollars to small firms.
 We compare the bid-discount program to an alternative preference mechanism
 that relies on lump-sum entry subsidies and/or taxes. We find that an appropriately
 chosen tax/subsidy policy is more effective in lowering the cost to the government
 in absolute terms, as well as when constraining the policy to achieve California's
 allocative goal. It does so by extracting bidders' full expected surplus. Such a strong
 negative impact on bidders' profitability may be undesirable for government policy.
 Interestingly, we show that the tax/subsidy policy results in a higher cost to the gov
 ernment than the corresponding bid discount policy if the objective is to achieve the
 allocative goal while holding large-firm profits at the level under the bid discount.
 This result underscores an important benefit of the bid preference program: it is
 able to moderate the degree of profit redistribution and the increase in the cost of
 procurement, while delivering changes in allocation of work across bidder groups.
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a brief overview of the highway
 procurement market in California and the details of the Small Business Preference
 program. Section II outlines the model of firms' joint participation and bidding deci
 sions. Section III describes our estimation methodology, the results of which are in
 Section IV. Section V contains an analysis of the current and alternative programs.
 Section VI concludes.
 I. California's Highway Procurement Market
 In this section, we describe the California highway procurement market and
 our data. We focus on highway and street maintenance projects auctioned by the
 California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) between January 2002 and
 December 2005. California's Small Business Preference program is implemented
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 on state-funded projects. During the sample period, Caltrans advertised 869 state
 funded projects, of which complete data are available for 697 projects.7 The data
 include information on project characteristics, the set of companies that purchased
 detailed project specifications and their small business status, the set of actual bid
 ders, their bids, and, finally, the identity of the winning bidder.
 A. Letting Process
 Caltrans advertises projects three to ten weeks prior to the bidding date. The proj
 ect advertisement usually contains only limited information, such as type of work,
 location, and completion time. Interested contractors must purchase detailed project
 plans from Caltrans' project counter at least one week before the bid opening date.
 Only those firms that purchased project plans (plan holders) may submit a bid on
 the project. Our data suggest that purchasing a plan signals interest in bidding; we
 observe, for example, that in their plan purchases, companies focus on similar proj
 ects based on administrative district location and type of work. We therefore assume
 that the group of potential bidders on a given project coincides with the group of
 plan holders. The list of companies that purchased plans for a given project is posted
 on Caltrans' Web site. Therefore, potential bidders are known to each other at the
 time when they prepare their bids.
 To bid on a project, a company must submit by the bid opening date completed bid
 documents, which specify the bid amount, the list of subcontractors, their fees, and
 their tasks. The preparation of bid documents requires time and effort and is, there
 fore, costly. We treat such bid preparation costs as entry costs in our model below.
 During the bid preparation process, companies engage in extensive negotiations
 with subcontractors. It is likely that participants learn about other companies pre
 paring bids for the same project from subcontractors. Anecdotal evidence confirms
 that such information leakage occurs. Discussions with industry insiders also sug
 gest that prime contractors are careful not to reveal other information about their
 bid proposal, such as the cost of other contract items, quotes received from other
 subcontractors, etc., to potential subcontractors. Price negotiations also typically
 continue up until the bid submission deadline, limiting the subcontractor's ability to
 convey any price information to competitors.
 As is evident from the bid documents, the sets of subcontractors often overlap
 across companies submitting bids for the same auction. Common subcontractor use
 can potentially induce affiliation into bidders' costs, i.e., a correlation in their costs
 in excess of any correlation introduced by factors known to bidders. We investigated
 empirically how important such subcontractor induced correlation is in explaining
 bid levels. Using price data and subcontractor information at the level of the individ
 ual contract item for a subsample of our bid documents, we find that the identity of
 the subcontractor explains approximately 6 percent of the average item price across
 items and contractors. This combined with the fact that the total value of items for
 which common subcontractors are used constitutes at most 5 percent of the overall
 bid suggests that the extent of affiliation due to common subcontractor use is low.
 7Caltrans did not preserve lists of companies that purchased bid documents for some projects.
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 B. Preference Program
 The Small Business Preference program sets a goal of allocating 25 percent of
 state procurement dollars to small firms. The program is implemented using a first
 price sealed-bid auction mechanism. It grants small firms a bid discount equal to
 5 percent of the low nonfavored bid, reducing their bids for comparison purposes
 only when determining the winner. The winner is then paid the full amount of
 his bid.
 To qualify for the discount, a company has to satisfy three conditions. It has to be
 independently owned and operated; have fewer than 100 employees; and have aver
 age annual gross receipts limited to $10 million over the previous three tax years.8 A
 common concern with preference programs is the potential for abuse and manipula
 tion. The structure of the procurement market renders such abuse more difficult than
 in other markets. Strict subcontracting limits are in place, and Caltrans monitors
 projects to ensure that the chosen contractor adheres to these limits. In addition,
 small contractors' competitors have a vested interest to ensure that the small
 business status is used only when applicable. While the instance of abuse is rare,
 the state also actively prosecutes and penalizes abusers, both imposing monetary
 penalties and withdrawing the right to participate in future procurement auctions.
 We obtained quarterly information on the certification status of companies in our
 dataset from the Department of General Services. In our sample, out of 672 compa
 nies that bid on at least one project, 269, or 40 percent, were certified as small busi
 nesses. Caltrans awarded 39.02 percent of contracts to qualified small businesses.
 The total value of these contracts accounted for only 15.45 percent of total procure
 ment dollars, however. Most of the projects allocated to small firms are therefore
 small. It also means that Caltrans does not meet the program's allocative goal. The
 bid preference altered the identity of the winning bidder in only 5 percent of projects.
 II. Model of Firms' Participation and Bidding Decisions
 This section develops a model of firms' participation and bidding decisions that
 forms the basis for our empirical analysis below. We assume that a total of N poten
 tial contractors express interest in a single standalone project offered for bid. Bidder
 i's decisions reflect two separate costs; entry costs of preparing a bid, denoted by dh
 and costs of completing the contract (project costs), denoted as c,.
 We incorporate a preference rule similar to the one used in California into our
 model. For the purpose of comparison, bids of favored firms are reduced by an
 amount equal to 8 percent of the lowest nonfavored bid. A favored firm is awarded
 the project if its reduced bid is below the lowest nonfavored bid. For a given low
 est nonfavored bid of bh a favored firm thus wins the project if its bid is lower than
 (1 + S)bl. It receives the full amount of its bid as payment. A preference program
 thus introduces an asymmetry into the payoffs of favored and other firms. In our
 8 Such revenue restrictions could affect small firms' entry behavior. For example, a company may decide not
 to bid on a large project if winning this project brings it over or very close to the revenue threshold. In our data,
 however, 99 percent of small firms have yearly revenue below $5.4 million, relative to a large project's typical size
 of about $1 million. Therefore, in most cases winning one additional large project does not impact the small-firm
 status of a company, and we do not model such dynamic concerns about qualifying for small-firm status.
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 analysis we also allow for the possibility that favored (group 1) and other (group 2)
 firms differ systematically in their costs of preparing bids, GkD, and of completing
 the project, Fkc. Here k(i) denotes group affiliation of bidder i. We assume that proj
 ect and bid preparation costs are private information of each firm and are distributed
 independently across all firms and identically within group.
 Similar to other work on auction participation (e.g., William F. Samuelson 1985,
 Dan Levin and James L. Smith 1994), we model a potential bidder's decision as a
 two-stage process. In the first stage, each potential bidder decides whether to partici
 pate in the auction. In the second stage, actual bidders prepare and submit their bids.
 When deciding over participation, potential bidder i of group k(i) knows his own
 cost of entry, dh the distributions of project and entry costs, Fkc and GkD, k = 1,2,
 and the numbers of potential bidders by group, Nk^,N_un. Only firms with an entry
 cost below the expected profit from participation choose to enter the auction. Firms
 that decided to enter pay bid preparation costs, become actual bidders, and submit
 bids. By incurring bid preparation costs, a bidder learns his costs of completing the
 contract, c„ and the numbers of his actual competitors by group, (nk^ — 1 ,n_k^).
 Our model of entry resembles the setup in Levin and Smith (1994) by relying on
 two assumptions: (i) a potential bidder does not observe his project cost realization at
 the time of his participation decision but learns it through the investment of bid prep
 aration costs; (ii) bidders know the numbers of their competitors when they decide
 on a bid level.9 An alternative to assumption (i) is presented in Samuelson (1985),
 where project costs are known at the time of entry.10 This alternative informational
 environment finds less support than the assumption we use in empirical tests of entry
 models.11 We also carefully considered the applicability of assumption (ii) to our
 setting. We experimented with an alternative informational assumption that firms do
 not have knowledge of the numbers of bidders throughout the entire bidding process.
 This model generally produced markups that were significantly higher than typical
 highway construction markups. Assumptions (i) and (ii) greatly facilitate the compu
 tation of participation and bidding strategies, in particular given our context of asym
 metric auctions where we have to find equilibrium bidding strategies numerically, as
 we discuss below.12 This is what allows us to conduct an extensive counterfactual
 analysis, which would have to be significantly curtailed under either of the two alter
 native informational environments discussed here.
 A. Characterization of Equilibrium in the Bidding Stage
 We begin with an analysis of the bidding stage and then use the results to analyze
 the participation stage. We focus on group-symmetric equilibria where bidders of
 9Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) also rely on these assumptions.
 10James Roberts and Andrew Sweeting (2010) analyze the properties of this and related models for second
 price auctions.
 11 In the context of symmetric auctions, Vadim Maimer, Artyom Shneyerov, and Pai Xu (2007) and Li and Zheng
 (2009) perform tests of alternative models of entry using different methodologies. Both sets of authors find more
 statistical support for a two-stage entry model where firms are initially uninformed or only partially informed about
 their project costs and pay an entry cost to learn their actual realization than an alternative where project costs are
 known at the time of entry.
 l2Assumption (i) also simplifies the empirical implementation of the model. The lack of selection on project
 costs allows us to recover their full (untruncated) distribution in estimation and we are able to more easily incorpo
 rate the effect of unobserved project characteristics on firms' bidding behavior.
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 group k follow the same bidding strategy, /?*(•), mapping project cost, c„ into a bid
 bi, Pk(') '• [c, c] —> \bk, bk]. Due to the bid-preference program, a bidder i of group k
 wins the project if his bid bt is below all competing bids adjusted by the bid discount
 <5 where applicable. Firm i with project cost c, and group membership k(i) chooses
 bid to maximize expected profit conditional on participating:
 (1) 7r,(c,) = (b, - C;)Pr(&,■ < bhMl : k{l) = k{i))
 x Pr(fc; < (1 + 8y-2I{k=2)b„Wl : k{l) ± k(i))
 = (bt - c,)( 1 - Fkc[^l(b,)])nk-l(\ - F-Ck\{3-_1( 1 + sy-^bfty-*,
 where I{k = 2) is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i belongs to group 2.
 The first-order condition of the firm's bidding problem is:
 (2) 1 = Kq ~ ^^(0
 b' - c' (1 - [/?,-(!) M db'
 »-,(,•)(! + ^)1-2/(t(')=2)^(')[/3=l(o((l + '5)1"2fW')=2)^)]^=l(i-)
 (1 - [/?=!(.)(( 1 + 5)1-2/(^=2)^]) db,
 The preference program introduces two interesting features into the equilibrium,
 reflecting the increased competitiveness of favored bidders. First, a single favored
 bidder with c, = c finds it optimal to bid above his cost when bidding against sev
 eral nonfavored bidders since the bid discount sufficiently lowers his effective bid
 to result in a nonzero probability of winning the project.13 In contrast, with mul
 tiple favored bidders, competitive pressure reduces the upper boundary bid to cost.
 Second, since the highest effective bid submitted by a favored bidder is given by
 bx/1 + S, nonfavored bidders with cost c,- E [b\/{\ + 5),c) can never win an auc
 tion where a small bidder is present and earn positive profit.
 The behavior of bidders with boundary cost draws can be summarized as follows.
 (i) Right-boundary condition. Favored bidders with cost level c bid bx = c if
 nx > 1. If «] = I, b\ is the bid level that maximizes
 P) T, = (5, - C)(l - ■
 Nonfavored bidders with c2 E [bt/( 1 + 5), c) have a zero probability of winning
 and, therefore, bid their cost.
 I3Note that consistent with Caltrans policy, we do not impose a reserve price. If only a single bidder chose to
 enter the auction, there are thus no constraints on his bid. We follow Li and Zheng (2009) and assume that in such
 instances, the government steps in as a second bidder, drawing its project cost from the nonfavored cost distribution.
 This approximates the competitive pressure that Caltrans imposes in such instances through the right to reject a bid
 and rescope a project. Since our data do not contain projects with only one bidder, this assumption is relevant only
 when computing the expected profit from entry by averaging over all possible bidder combinations.
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 (ii) Left-boundary condition. There exists a bid level b{ such that for all favored
 firms, /^(c) = b_\. For all nonfavored bidders, /32(c) — b2 = bl/( 1 + 5).
 The proof of these properties follows the standard reasoning for boundary conditions
 in first-price auctions. Theorem 2.1 in Philip J. Reny and Shmuel Zamir (2004) estab
 lishes the existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium in this environment.
 B. Characterization of Equilibrium in the Participation Stage
 At the participation stage, firms compare the ex ante expected profit conditional
 on entry to their entry cost dt. Firms with entry costs below their expected profit
 decide to incur the entry fee to learn about their cost of completing the project. Ex
 ante expected profit from participating is given by
 (4) %{pi,p2) = Y, I nk(c',nk - 1 ,n_k)dFkc(c) Pr(n* - 1 ,n_k\NhN_k),
 nl-l,n.kcNk-l,N^t \°£ /
 where Pr(nk — l,n_k\NhN_k) is the probability of observing (nk — 1) competitors
 of the firm's own group and n_k competitors of the opposite group, given numbers
 of potential entrants of Nk and N_k. nk(c\nk - 1 ,n_k) is the expected equilibrium
 profit of a bidder from group k with cost realization c. It reflects that at the participa
 tion stage, the firm is uncertain about both its own project cost and the competitive
 environment it will face upon entry. As a result, the expected profit differs only by
 group k, but not by firm i. The firms assess the probability that there will be nk — 1
 and n_k competitors in the auction as
 (5) Pr(nk — l,n_k\NhN_k)
 = cx-\cyk(pk)n*-l(\ - pk)N>-n'-2(p-k)n-'(i - P-k)N-"-n-\
 where CnN denotes the binomial coefficient of choosing n firms out of N potential
 bidders.
 The participation decision is described by group-specific entry cost thresholds, Dk,
 such that only firms with entry costs below their group's threshold participate in the
 auction. They are defined by a zero-profit rule so that Dx (p,,p2) — and
 DiiPuPi) = Ttiip^Pi)-1° equilibrium, bidders' beliefs are correct and the equilib
 rium entry probabilities solve the system of equations
 (6) Pi = Gl[Dl(pl,p2)\
 Pi = G2[D2(pi,p2)\.
 Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem guarantees that the group-specific equilibrium
 of this game exists. In general, the entry equilibrium is not unique. There may be
 multiple threshold pairs that solve equation (6). These equilibria are observationally
 equivalent in terms of submitted bids and differ only in entry probabilities. We
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 verify the uniqueness of the equilibrium entry probabilities numerically within the
 estimation routine.14
 III. Estimation
 The theoretical model describes group-specific participation and bidding strate
 gies that map firms' project and participation costs and their respective distributions
 into observed bids and participation behavior. This section outlines the estimation
 methodology we use to recover parameters of the underlying distributions of entry
 and project costs from available data. We use a two-step estimation approach. In the
 first step, parameters of the bid distribution and the distribution of entry costs are
 estimated without imposing the full set of equilibrium restrictions. In the second
 step, the distribution of project costs is recovered from the equilibrium bidding first
 order conditions following the procedure described in Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle
 Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000).15
 A. Empirical Model
 We assume that at announcement, a project is characterized by (xJ,zJ,Uj,Nlj,N2j).
 Here xy- and zdenote potentially overlapping project characteristics observable to the
 researcher that affect the distributions of project and entry costs, respectively. There
 may also exist other project attributes that impact firms' bidding and participation
 behavior that are not present in the data. These factors are summarized by the vari
 able Uj. As in Krasnokutskaya (2011), we assume that bidders' project costs for proj
 ect j are given by Cy = CyUj. Here, ctj is a firm-specific cost component that is private
 information of firm i, while Uj represents a portion of project j's cost that is known to
 all bidders but is unobserved to the researcher, i.e., unobserved project heterogene
 ity.16 The distribution of the firm-specific cost component for group-/: firms is given
 by F~(-1 Xj), while the distribution of unobserved project heterogeneity is given by
 l4The equilibrium in the bidding stage results in nonfavored bidders with c2 € [£>, (1 + 5)"',c) having a zero
 probability of winning. Such firms may decide to drop out of the auction after learning their costs. In this case,
 equation(6) should be adjusted to pk = Gk[Dt(pl,p2pnb)],k = 1,2, where pnb denotes the probability of nonfavored
 bidders leaving the auction after learning their project cost realization. In estimation, the full distribution of large
 firm project costs can be recovered from auctions that did not attract any small bidders. The probabilities p2pnb can
 be recovered from ratios of cumulative distribution functions of project costs for projects with n, = {1,2} and those
 with «| = 0 for interior cost levels.
 I5Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Martin Pesendorfer (2003) and Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) use similar estimation
 methodologies. A standard procedure of estimating the distribution of project costs directly from the data poses
 severe computational challenges for models with asymmetric bidders. The computational burden is high because
 these models typically do not yield closed-form solutions for firms' bidding strategies, which are instead found
 numerically for every parameter guess and every project. A disadvantage of such indirect approaches is that they
 impose a parametric assumption on the bid distribution, which is not a primitive of the underlying model. To mini
 mize any resulting misspecification bias, we use a flexibly specified bid distribution, controlling for a large number
 of project characteristics and time trends.
 16The unobserved heterogeneity rationalizes correlation in bid residuals. There are two possible sources of
 such a correlation: (i) factors that are observable to all bidders, but not to the econometrician (unobserved hetero
 geneity), or (ii) factors that are unobservable to both bidders and the econometrician. The latter case is referred to
 as affiliation of costs. Given the current lack of results on the nonparametric identification of a model with both
 unobserved heterogeneity and affiliation, researchers typically focus on the more important source of correlation in
 their specific empirical setting. We believe that in our application, unobserved auction heterogeneity dominates, as
 described in Section II. Li and Bingyu Zhang (2010) describe a methodology that is appropriate for markets where
 affiliation in costs is more important.
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 H(-). We further assume that firms observe the realization of the unobserved project
 characteristic prior to making their entry decisions. It, therefore, affects both firms'
 participation and bidding behavior.
 The firm-specific project cost components, dy, are mutually independent condi
 tional on project characteristics, x, and ujy and are independent of the unobserved
 auction heterogeneity component, uf.
 ni+n2
 (7) ^c|x(^i' •• "'^(ni+n2) I *,/>^j) I ^j) 11 Fc{^(^;I */)•
 1=1
 The unobserved heterogeneity component, Up is independent of project char
 acteristics Xj and Zj and of the numbers of potential entrants, Ny and N2j, i.e.,
 H(-\Xj,Zj,Ny,N2j) = H(-).
 Since we assume that bidders observe the numbers of their actual competitors
 when preparing their bid, firm Vs bidding strategy for project j depends on proj
 ect characteristics, xy- and Uj, and the numbers of actual bidders. Letting /3k(-1-)
 and /3k(-\-) denote the group-Zc bidding strategies associated with arbitrary draw Uj
 and with Uj = 1, respectively, under our assumed cost structure /3k^(cy | x7, Uj,nXj, n2j)
 = Ujj3k/j\(cu\xj,n{j,n2j). This implies by = bt]up where by denotes the firm-specific
 bid component given by by = Pk{i){cy\Xj,nXj,n2j), or ln(^y) = In(b^) -f ln(w7).
 Therefore, the distribution of log-bids for project j depends on Xj, Uj, n{j, and n2j, with
 the log of the unobserved project heterogeneity acting as an additive mean shifter.
 The distribution of firms' bid preparation costs, dy, is given by Gkj'' (• | Zj). We
 assume that firms' bid preparation costs are independent conditional on observed
 and unobserved project characteristics, x;-, zand up and the number of potential
 bidders, Ny and N2j. The theoretical model implies that in the auction for project j
 firms' participation behavior is characterized by group-specific thresholds, Dkj(-),
 defined by equation (6). The bid preparation cost is private information. Therefore,
 from the researcher's and the competitors' point of view, the number of actual bid
 ders from group k is distributed according to a binomial distribution with probability
 of success of pk (xj, Uj, zp Ny, N2j) and Nkj trials, where
 (8) pk (xj, Uj, Zj, Ny, N2j) Gk{Dkj(x.j,Uj,Nij,Ny)\Zj).
 In estimation, we make parametric assumptions about the distributions of interest
 because of the relatively small size of our dataset, exploiting instead the availability
 of a large number of covariates that potentially affect project and entry cost distri
 butions.17 We assume that the log of the individual bid component ln(fey) is normal
 with mean, fj,F,kj, and variance, a2F kj, specified as:
 (9) E [In(by) | Xy,tiy,n2j] = [Xj,nij,n2j\'ak
 Var [In (b^\xpnXj,n2} = (exp(yj^))2,
 17 Our parametric assumptions are motivated by prior literature (see for example Han Hong and Matthew Shum
 2002, Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona 1993, etc.), and by results in Krasnokutskaya (2011) that indicate that
 the distributions of the firm-specific bid component and of unobserved heterogeneity are close to log-normal.
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 where yy includes some of the project characteristics contained in x;. We further
 assume that In (uj) is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero
 and standard deviation au.
 Last, to ensure that entry costs are positive, we assume that they are distributed
 according to a normal distribution left-truncated at 0 with mean E [dy | z;] = zpk and
 a constant, group-specific standard deviation ak.
 Our empirical model yields predictions for equilibrium bids and group-specific
 participation probabilities. We match these to data using a generalized method of
 moments estimator. Here, we summarize the theoretical moment conditions that
 we use to estimate the parameters of the firm-specific bid component, unobserved
 heterogeneity, and entry cost distributions. The online Appendix contains a detailed
 derivation of the theoretical and empirical moment conditions we use.
 To estimate the parameters of the mean of log-bids, ln(£>y), we exploit that:
 The moment condition for the parameters that correspond to the numbers of bidders
 reflects the dependence of the joint distribution of (n{,n2) on u through pk(xj,Uj,Zj,
 We identify the parameters of the standard deviation of ln(^), from the follow
 ing second-order moments:
 (11) m3 = E[(ln(fcJ - In(bhJ))2]
 = £[(exP(yiwo))2 + (exP(y/wy))2] + E[([xJ,niJ,n2/]'(am - a*(i2)))2]
 m4 = £[*,/(In (£;„•) - ln(fcy))2]
 Finally, the standard deviation of the distribution of unobserved project heterogene
 ity, au, is estimated from a second-order moment condition:
 (12) m5 = £[(ln(fy) - [x;.,ny,n2;]'aMi))2] = a\ + £:[(exp(yjr/t))2].
 B. Estimation Approach
 (10) mx = £[xj(ln(b^ - [xj^n^'a^)] = 0
 m2 = E[nkJ (In (bij) - [xy,nv,n2J'aK0)]
 £k;((exp(yiw,)))2 + (exp(yj?7t(l2)))2)] + £[^([x,-,«iy,- c^y))2].
 In estimation, we also use moments of order three and four for the bid distribu
 tion.18 Their derivation is presented in the online Appendix.
 18 We experimented with moments of higher order as well. However, the estimates were not substantially
 affected by inclusion of these moments.
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 A second group of moments is used to recover parameters of the entry cost
 distributions, 7* and ak. We use the first and the second moments of the bino
 mial distribution for the numbers of actual bidders.19 We specifically consider
 separate moments for bidder groups, k, and project size categories, sizej, where
 sizej = {small, medium, large}:
 (13) m£' = E[nkj\ sizej = I}
 = J J Pt(Xj,Zj,Uj,NIj,N2j)Nkjh(u)dudF(Xj,Zj,N1j,N2j\sizej = I)
 (14) mk-} = E[njj\ sizej = /]
 = I I (Pk(xrzrurNipN2j)(l ~ Pk{XpZpUj,Ny,N2j))Nkj
 + N2kjPk(Xj,Zj,Uj,Nv,N2j))h(u)dudF(\j,Zj,Nij,N2j\sizej = I).
 In computing the empirical counterparts to the moment conditions in equations
 (10) through (14), we use Monte Carlo simulation techniques to integrate over the
 distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Our reliance on simulation techniques
 motivates our choice of a simulated GMM estimator over a simulated maximum
 likelihood estimator, which is highly nonlinear in participation probabilities and
 therefore more sensitive to simulation error in the at times small participation prob
 abilities (see Daniel Ackerberg et al. (2007) for a discussion of the advantages of
 simulated GMM in similar discrete-choice settings).
 To compute the value of objective function for a given guess of parameter values
 we follow a number of steps. First, for every draw from the distribution of unob
 served heterogeneity h(uj), we use the first-order conditions for optimal bidding to
 recover the project cost distributions implied by the bid distribution, F\, consistent
 with the current parameter guess (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong 2000).
 Next, we numerically solve the equilibrium conditions on the participation side,
 equation (6), using a nonlinear equation solver to find the equilibrium entry prob
 abilities. To compute the expected profit from bidding in equation (6), we use the
 recovered distribution of project costs to compute the expected profit for every
 possible combination of competitors (nk^ — 1 ,h_k^j), hkliy = 0,1,...,Nk^y — 1
 and = 0,1,... ,N_k^. Then we combine these values into an expected profit
 from bidding using bidder Vs beliefs about the distribution of the numbers of his
 competitors. We obtain moment conditions by averaging over simulation draws as
 described in the online Appendix. We arrive at the value of objective function by
 collecting moment conditions into the GMM objective function.
 19We estimated specifications that rely on various combinations of first, second, and higher-order moments
 for the distribution of the numbers of actual bidders. The latter are derived in the online Appendix. The results are
 very similar across the specifications. We report results for a specification that uses all first moments and second
 moments for the number of small bidders. We study the fit of the model based on moments not used in estimation.
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 C. Model Identification
 We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the econometric identification
 of our parameters. While we rely on parametric assumptions for the bids, entry costs,
 and unobserved heterogeneity, these distributions can be identified from our data non
 parametrically. Krasnokutskaya (2011) contains a detailed discussion of the nonpara
 metric identification of the firm-specific cost component's distribution in the presence
 of unobserved project heterogeneity. The identification argument relies on the fact
 that conditional on the number of actual bidders, the firm-specific cost components
 are independent across bidders and from the unobserved heterogeneity component.
 This property holds for our participation model, as we show in the online Appendix.
 Using the procedure from Krasnokutskaya (2011), we can nonparametrically recover
 the marginal distributions of the firm-specific cost components and the distribution of
 unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the numbers of actual bidders. The marginal
 distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is then obtained by integrating the numbers of
 bidders, using the empirical distributions of the numbers of bidders in the data.
 The distribution of entry costs is also identified nonparametrically. Details of the
 proof are in Krasnokutskaya (2009) and are summarized in the online Appendix. It
 can be shown that there is a unique cumulative distribution function G that could
 have generated the observed participation behavior under our model of entry. The
 proof relies on the existence of a full-support variable that affects the distribution of
 project costs, but not that of entry costs.
 Parametric identification of G hinges on moment condition m6, which represents
 the average numbers of bidders by project size category and group. For each group,
 the moments trace the average number of bidders as a function of project size. The
 intercept of this profile identifies the constant of the distribution of entry costs; the
 slope identifies the coefficient for project size; and the curvature identifies the vari
 ance of the entry cost distribution.
 IV. Empirical Analysis
 This section presents results of our empirical analysis. We first summarize descriptive
 patterns in the data that speak to the presence of cost asymmetries across groups of bid
 ders, the heterogeneity of projects in our dataset, and the strategic response of bidders
 to the bid preference program. We next implement our estimation strategy. We demon
 strate that the predicted bid and entry choices based on our estimated parameters fit the
 data well, including for groups of projects not used in estimation. The estimated param
 eters of the entry cost distribution imply reasonable entry costs. The results confirm the
 presence of substantial asymmetries across bidder groups and important variation in
 the degree of asymmetries that correlates with project characteristics. Small bidders have
 higher project and entry costs for the majority of projects. However, we also identify a
 sizable set of projects where small bidders have lower project or entry costs or both.
 A. Descriptive Analysis
 Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the set of state-funded projects that we
 use in estimation. Important project characteristics include the engineer's estimate
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 Table 1—Summary Statistics, Caltrans Projects and Bidders
 Standard  10th  90th
 Mean deviation  percentile  Median percentile
 Engineer's estimate  615.416  738.560  165.250  464.130  1,086
 Working days  96.598  165.071  20  45  180
 Number of small plan holders  3.947  3.485  0  3  9
 Number of large plan holders  6.574  4.324  3  5  11
 Number of small bidders  1.745  1.890  0  1  4
 Number of large bidders  2.623  1.597  1  3  5
 Small projects (n = 229; median engineer's estimate = $207,000)
 Number of small plan holders 4.886 3.656
 Number of large plan holders 5.904 3.501
 Number of small bidders 2.502 2.137
 Number of large bidders 2.349 1.652
 Medium projects (n = 235; median engineer's estimate = $464,000)
 Number of small plan holders 4.260 3.536
 Number of large plan holders 6.723 3.922
 Number of small bidders 1.762 1.882
 Number of large bidders 2.668 1.561
 Large projects (n = 233; median engineer's estimate = $787,186)
 Number of small plan holders 2.714 2.829
 Number of large plan holders 7.651 6.649
 Number of small bidders 0.954 1.219
 Number of large bidders 2.929 1.645
 Notes: 697 projects. Engineer's estimate reported in $ 1,000s and duration in days. Small proj
 ects denote the bottom one-third, medium projects the middle one-third, and large projects
 the top one-third of engineer's estimates. Plan holders are our measure of potential entrants.
 of the project's total cost, the type of work involved, the project's location at the
 level of the administrative district, and the time allocated to complete the project.
 The engineer's estimate reflects Caltrans' assessment of the project's price based on
 similar projects auctioned in the past. We follow other procurement auction studies
 (e.g., Hong and Shum 2002, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003, Porter and Zona
 1993) in using it as a proxy for the size of the project.
 We split projects into five work categories: bridge work; landscaping; road repair;
 signs, signals, and lighting; and small building work. Road-repair projects account
 for 60.26 percent of contracts; small building work accounts for another 15.93 per
 cent of contracts, while 10.04 percent of contracts are for bridge work. The remain
 ing contracts are split roughly equally between landscaping and signs/lighting work.
 Across projects, the median project has an engineer's estimate of $464,000 (stan
 dard deviation of $740,000) and duration of 45 working days (standard deviation
 of 165 days). Table 1 further highlights significant heterogeneity in the competitive
 environment. On average a project attracts four small potential bidders and 6.5 large
 potential bidders with 1.7 small and 2.6 large firms submitting bids.
 The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes potential and actual entry separately for
 small, medium, and large projects, representing the terciles of the distribution of the
 engineer's estimate. The small-firm participation rate declines sharply with project
 size. It drops from 51 percent of small potential bidders submitting bids in small
 projects to only 35 percent in large projects. In contrast, the participation rate of large
 firms is roughly constant across project sizes, ranging from 38 percent to 40 percent.
 To investigate how participation rates vary with project characteristics, we con
 duct a probit analysis of a potential bidder's decision to submit a bid (see Table 2).
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 ln(Engineer's estimate) x I(Large)  0.0563  0.0291  0.0223
 Working days x I(Large)  -0.0300  0.0170  -0.0119
 Number of large plan holders x I(Large) -0.0537***  0.0136  -0.0213
 Number of small plan holders x I(Large) -0.0944***  0.0089  -0.0374
 ln(Engineer's estimate) x I(Small)  -0.1458***  0.0338  -0.0578
 Working Days x I(Small)  0.0538***  0.0144  0.0213
 Number of large plan holders x I(Small)  -0.0412***  0.0074  -0.0163
 Number of small plan holders x I(Small) -0.0783***  0.0081  -0.0310
 Rural district x road repair x I( Small)  -0.7594***  0.1488  -0.2724
 Rural district x other work x I(Small)  -0.6199***  0.1609  -0.2273
 Urban district x road repair x I(Small)  -0.8823***  0.1466  -0.3135
 Urban district x other work x I(Small)  -0.7030***  0.1619  -0.2554
 Rural district x road repair x I(Large)  0.2898*  0.1366  0.1152
 Rural district x other work x I(Large)  0.2282  0.1804  0.0909
 Urban district x road repair x I(Large)  0.2516  0.1490  0.1000
 Urban district x other work x I(Large)  0.2062  0.1605  0.0821
 Observations  6,538
 Notes: Dependent variable: indicator of participation decision. Year and month effects
 included. Number of competing bidders included to control for unobserved project character
 istics. Standard errors account for clustering at the project level. I(Large) indicates a large firm,
 I(Small) a small firm. Road repair includes bridge projects.
 ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
 **Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 We include proxies for the competitive environment and project characteristics
 (size, time to completion, type of work, location) and allow the coefficients to differ
 for small and large plan holders. We control for unobserved project characteristics
 by including the number of actual bidders. We divide project locations into rural
 and urban based on the project's administrative district, defining a project to be
 rural if it is located in the North Coast, North Central, South Central, or Southern
 Sierra districts. We also combine bridge and road work into one group, relative to
 the remaining contracts.
 The probit analysis reveals a negative, statistically significant effect of the num
 ber of potential competitors on a firm's participation decision. This is true for
 potential competitors of the same group as well as of the opposite group. The
 presence of an additional small potential bidder decreases both a small and a large
 firm's propensity to submit a bid by about twice the reduction brought forth by
 the presence of an additional large potential bidder, a statistically significant dif
 ference. This evidence is consistent with companies' strategic response to the bid
 preference program.
 Table 2 also suggests heterogeneity in participation across locations and type of
 work. We include interaction variables of the project's location (urban or rural) and
 the project's type of work (road repair/bridge or other) and estimate differences
 between small and large firms' participation rates. Across project types, small firms
 have statistically significantly lower participation rates than large firms. The differ
 ence is more pronounced for urban projects, which are larger on average than rural
 projects, in line with the results in Table 1. Small firms are also less likely to partici
 pate in road-repair than in other projects, regardless of project location; however, the
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 Table 3—Ordinary Least Squares Model of Submitted Bid
 Coefficient  Standard error
 Small-firm indicator  0.0813**  0.0357
 ln(Engineer's estimate)  0.9571***  0.0127
 Working days  0.0002***  0.0001
 Number of small bidders  -0.0320***  0.0074
 Number of large bidders  -0.0329***  0.0069
 Number of small plan holders  0.0097**  0.0041
 Number of large plan holders  0.0190***  0.0038
 Notes: Observations: 3,034. Adjusted R2: 0.8996. Dependent variable: log of submitted bid.
 Controls for year, month, districts, and type of work by bidder group included. Standard errors
 account for clustering at the project level.
 ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
 difference is statistically significant for urban projects only. Large firms, in contrast,
 exhibit less heterogeneity in participation choices, and we cannot reject the equality
 of participation rates across locations and types of work.
 These regularities indicate that project size, location, and type of work affect entry
 in a group-specific way, potentially reflecting differences in the cost of completing a
 particular project or the cost of preparing bid documents. To investigate the former,
 we conduct a regression analysis that relates log-bid levels to project characteris
 tics.20 Table 3 summarizes the results. The estimated coefficients have the expected
 signs. We find that log-bids increase in the engineer's estimate and the project's dura
 tion.21 In addition, we find significant variation in bid levels across work types and
 locations, even after controlling for project size. Conditional on project characteris
 tics, the average bid of a small bidder is 8.1 percent higher than that of a large bidder.
 In summary, the descriptive evidence suggests that bidding and entry behavior
 differ by firm group. We find that the number of small potential bidders affects par
 ticipation decisions of both groups of bidders more strongly than the number of large
 potential bidders. This suggests that the Small Business Preference program affects
 the operation of this market. At the same time, small firms submit bids significantly
 less frequently and, if they do, bid higher than large firms. Such participation and
 bidding behavior could arise due to large differences in project costs between small
 and large firms even if the costs of preparing bids are similar across groups. On the
 other hand, even without pronounced differences in project costs, small firms' bids
 may be higher due to the competitive advantage awarded by the preference program,
 while their less frequent entry is due to larger bid preparation costs.
 We now turn to the results of the estimated empirical model that allows us to dis
 entangle the role of the preference program from inherent cost differences between
 firms, both of which are reflected in the observed firm choices.
 20We include the numbers of potential bidders to control for unobserved project heterogeneity.
 21 In separate regression models (available upon request), we investigate the role of capacity constraints in
 explaining firm behavior, which would introduce a dynamic element to the firms' decision making. We follow
 Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) in computing a measure of backlog at the time of each bidding decision but do
 not find a statistically significant relationship between the capacity measure and firms' participation decisions or
 bids. The short time dimension of our data, which is likely to render our measure of capacity utilization imprecise,
 makes it difficult to interpret these findings.
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 B. Estimation Results
 We specify the mean of log bids as a linear function of the log of the engineer's
 estimate, duration, the numbers of actual and potential bidders and dummies for
 type of work and location. We also include year dummies to control for cost infla
 tion and monthly dummies to control for seasonal fluctuations in input prices. We
 allow the effects of most of these covariates to differ by bidder group. The variance
 of log-bids depends on the log of the engineer's estimate and the bidder's group.
 We assume that mean entry costs are a linear, group-specific function of the log
 engineer's estimate and allow for a group-specific standard deviation.22
 The results of estimation indicate that there are important differences in project
 and entry costs across groups of bidders. Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients
 of the bid distribution. The estimated coefficients are of the expected sign and mag
 nitude. They reflect substantial variation in the means and variances of log-bids
 across types of work and locations. They also imply substantial differences in log
 bids across bidder groups. We estimate that a small firm submits a bid that is, on
 average, 5.4 percent higher than a large firm's bid for the same project. We find
 that the variance of the underlying log-normal distribution of bids (which equals
 (expo,.-2 — l)exp(2nF + aF2)) increases in the engineer's estimate and is lower for
 small bidders. Unobserved project heterogeneity is important in our data. Increasing
 the unobserved project characteristic from a value of zero to a value equal to the
 estimated standard deviation of 0.17 has an effect on mean bids that is equivalent to
 a 20 percent increase in the engineer's estimate. The estimated bid distributions fit
 the data well; see Figure A-4 in the online Appendix for more detail.
 We use Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)'s methodology to recover the dis
 tribution of project costs from the distribution of bids. First, we use the first-order
 conditions from the firms' bidding problem to estimate inverse bid functions. Strict
 monotonicity of bid and inverse bid functions allows us to combine the estimated
 distribution of bids and inverse bid functions to obtain an estimate of the distribu
 tion of project costs. We summarize the estimated distributions of project costs in
 Table 5, where we report means and variances of project cost distributions as a frac
 tion of the engineer's estimate for categories of projects defined by size, type of
 work, and location. Table 5 shows that mean project costs are close to the engineer's
 estimate. It also highlights important differences in means and variances of cost
 distributions across groups of bidders. We test for the statistical significance of these
 differences next.
 We analyze differences in project costs across groups of bidders using a para
 metric bootstrap technique to test the hypothesis of the equality of the two groups'
 means (standard deviations) of their project cost distributions against two-sided and
 one-sided alternatives. Test results differ across projects. For some projects we can
 not reject equality of means or standard deviations, whereas for other projects we
 22 We also estimated several alternative specifications. First, we estimated a specification where the unobserved
 project heterogeneity depends on the number of potential bidders. The coefficients for the numbers of potential
 bidders in the standard deviation of unobserved heterogeneity are not statistically significant; the remaining coef
 ficients are qualitatively similar to our base specification. Second, we estimated specifications that include as addi
 tional entry cost shifters a project's number of individual tasks and nonlinear size effects. These variables do not
 have statistically significant effects on mean entry costs.
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 Table 4—Estimated Parameters of Log-Normal Distribution of Bids
 Coefficient  Standard error
 Constant  0.0762  0.0189
 I(Small)  0.0536  0.0184
 ln(Engineer's estimate)  0.9274  0.0034
 Working days  5.36E-05  8.89E-06
 Number of small bidders  -0.0412  0.0113
 Number of large bidders  -0.0386  0.0087
 Number of small plan holders  —6.88E-05  0.0051
 Number of large plan holders  0.0249  0.0195
 Type of work
 Bridge  -0.1244  0.0039
 Landscaping  -0.0406  0.0046
 Road repair  -0.0630  0.0089
 Signs, signals, lighting  0.0170  0.0064
 Location of work
 Central Coast  0.0098  0.0045
 East Central  0.1250  0.0042
 Los Angeles  0.0543  0.0054
 North Central  0.1387  0.0056
 North Coast  0.0805  0.0052
 Northern Sierras  0.1451  0.0051
 San Bernardino  0.0491  0.0039
 San Diego  -0.0241  0.0057
 San Francisco  0.0349  0.0037
 South Central  0.1432  0.0075
 Southern Sierras  0.0320  0.0080
 North Central x Small  -0.0730  0.0037
 North Coast x Small  -0.0484  0.0053
 South Central x Small  -0.0718  0.0072
 Southern Sierras x Small  -0.0643  0.0076
 Standard deviation of log-bids
 Constant  -1.6814  0.0438
 I(Small)  -0.0999  0.0180
 Engineer's estimate  -0.0550  0.0183
 Standard deviation of unobserved project characteristic, <xu 0.1684  0.0107
 Notes: Specification includes year and month effects by bidder type. Log-bids and the log of
 the unobserved project heterogeneity are assumed to be normally distributed. Standard devi
 ation of log-bids estimated as a = exp(fc0 + b, I(Small) -I- b2 Engineer's estimate) where
 I(Small) indicates a small firm.
 Table 5—Estimated Project Costs by Project Type
 Mean  Standard deviation
 Project  Small  Large  Small  Large
 Project type  count  bidder  bidder  bidder  bidder
 Small, rural, road repair/bridge  50  1.0245  1.0342  0.2341  0.2432
 Medium, rural, road repair/bridge 59  0.9491  0.9660  0.2032  0.2122
 Large, rural, road repair/bridge  55  0.9658  0.9739  0.2146  0.2227
 Small, urban, road repair/bridge  73  1.0503  1.0182  0.2247  0.2387
 Medium, urban, road repair/bridge  89  1.0152  0.9816  0.1905  0.2034
 Large, urban, road repair/bridge  88  0.9764  0.9602  0.1882  0.2024
 Small, rural, other work  39  1.0505  1.0624  0.2269  0.2407
 Medium, rural, other work  13  0.9952  0.9798  0.1822  0.2043
 Large, rural, other work  9  0.9559  0.9515  0.1572  0.1676
 Small, urban, other work  55  1.1329  1.0914  0.2289  0.2452
 Medium, urban, other work  51  1.0616  1.0303  0.2136  0.2272
 Large, urban, other work  35  1.0556  1.0268  0.2079  0.2228
 Notes: Means and standard deviations of project costs are averaged across projects of within
 project type and scaled by the engineer's estimate before averaging.
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 Table 6—Summary of Tests of Equality of Means of Cost Distributions by Project Type
 H,: small > large  H{. small < large
 Project  Number of  Percent  Number of  Percent
 Project type  count  rejections  rejections  rejections  rejections  Conclusion
 Small, rural, road repair  50  16  0.32  31  0.62  small < large
 Medium, rural, road repair  59  19  0.32  36  0.61  small < large
 Large, rural, road repair  55  20  0.36  29  0.53  small < large
 Small, urban, road repair  73  52  0.71  13  0.18  small > large
 Medium, urban, road repair  89  64  0.72  18  0.20  small > large
 Large, urban, road repair  88  50  0.57  27  0.31  small > large
 Small, rural, other work  39  11  0.28  26  0.63  small < large
 Medium, rural, other work  12  4  0.31  5  0.39  small > large
 Large, rural, other work  9  4  0.44  4  0.44  small > large
 Small, urban, other work  55  44  0.80  7  0.13  small > large
 Medium, urban, other work  51  38  0.75  10  0.20  small > large
 Large, urban, other work  35  23  0.66  3  0.09  small > large
 Notes: Columns 2 and 4 contain the count of projects for which we reject with 95 percent confidence the null
 hypothesis of equality of mean costs against the stated alternatives. Columns 3 and 5 report the fraction of projects
 in a given category for which the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of stated alternative. Similar tests for the differ
 ence in the estimated standard deviations yield rejections of the null hypothesis in favor of the standard deviation of
 small-firm costs being smaller than that of large-firm costs for more than 75 percent of projects in every category.
 Road repair includes bridge work.
 reject equality in favor of either group's having a lower mean (or standard devia
 tion). We aggregate the test results to the level of the project category (defined in
 Table 5) to document how cost differences between small and large bidders vary
 with project characteristics. In particular, for every project category, we compute the
 fraction of projects for which equality is rejected in the favor of two-sided or one of
 the one-sided alternatives. See Table 6.
 We find that with a two-sided alternative we reject the equality of means (and
 standard deviations) across bidder groups for most projects in our dataset. We,
 therefore, do not report the results of this test in the table. The tests with one-sided
 hypotheses are more interesting. We can reject an equality of means of the project
 cost distributions in favor of small bidders having a higher mean than large bidders
 for the majority of projects in most categories. For rural road work and small rural
 other work, however, we more frequently reject the null of equal means in favor of
 small bidders having lower mean project costs than large bidders. We also reject the
 null of equal standard deviations in favor of small bidders having lower standard
 deviations than large bidders for most projects in our dataset. There are thus impor
 tant project cost differences between small and large firms. However, small firms
 are not always weaker players in the market. With several exceptions,23 empirical
 auction studies rely on the assumption of symmetric bidders. Here, we document
 significant, and at times unexpected, differences between bidder groups. Such cost
 differences are important in our application since the use of discrimination is most
 effective in environments with asymmetric bidders.
 Next, we turn to the estimated coefficients for the cost of entry distribution reported
 in Table 7. All coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significantly
 different from zero. We have also estimated specifications that include conditional
 23For example, John Asker (2010), Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), Bajari (2001), and Jofre-Bonet and
 Pesendorfer (2003).
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 Table 7—Estimated Parameters of Truncated Normal Distribution of Entry Costs
 Coefficient  Standard error
 I(Small)  -0.6863  0.0116
 (ln(Eng. estimate)) x I(Small)  0.4818  0.0111
 I(Large)  -0.5589  0.1166
 (ln(Eng. estimate)) x I(Large)  0.3788  0.0435
 Standard deviation of entry costs
 I(Small)  0.1373  0.0042
 I(Large)  0.1679  0.0097
 Notes: The estimated specification allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the bid distribution;
 the estimated parameters are recorded in Table 4.1(Large) indicates a large firm; I(Small) a
 small firm.
 Table 8—Model Fit: Entry Predictions by Project Type
 Small firms  Large firms
 Number of
 projects  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  Actual
 Moment conditions: number of bidders
 Small projects  229  2.5199  2.5616  2.3140  2.3877
 Medium projects  235  1.9451  1.8962  2.6781  2.6766
 Large projects  233  1.2598  1.2222  2.9008  2.8528
 Moments conditions not used in estimation: number of bidders
 Bridge projects  70  2.1046  2.0714  2.5269  2.9286
 Road-repair projects  420  1.6739  1.5578  2.7271  2.8565
 Small and road-repair projects  258  2.5095  2.2844  2.0533  2.3527
 Medium and road-repair projects  439  1.6145  1.7215  2.9769  2.8115
 Large and road-repair projects  107  2.1737  2.0612  2.4518  2.6321
 Rural projects  143  1.7948  1.6167  2.7744  2.9091
 Urban projects  170  1.1778  1.1172  2.8597  2.9527
 Second-order moment conditions
 Small projects  229  1.6195  1.7164
 Medium projects  235  1.9341  1.7500
 Large projects  233  1.7478  1.6997
 Notes: The second moments compare the expectation of the number of small and large bidders squared as predicted
 by the model to the sample equivalent.
 moments based on the type of work and location in addition to size classes. We
 use these additional moments to perform a test of overidentifying restrictions. The
 overidentifying restrictions could not be rejected on the basis of our estimates, and
 the estimated parameters vary little across specifications.
 Table 8 reports the fit for our base specification. The top panel shows the fit for
 the moments that we use in the estimation. The lower panel reports average and
 predicted numbers of actual bidders for other project groupings that were not used
 to form moment conditions in estimation. While the literature has not established
 a benchmark for assessing the fit of the entry part of our model, our fit appears to
 be good.
 Table 9 reports the implied mean cost of entry and mean cost as a fraction of the
 engineer's estimate across bidder groups and project size categories. We estimate
 that mean entry costs amount to 2.2 percent to 3.9 percent of the engineer's estimate.
 This ratio increases with project size for small bidders but decreases in size for
 large bidders. Our estimates are comparable to estimates obtained in the academic
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 Table 9—Estimated Entry Costs by Project Size
 Small firms Large firms
 Standard Cost/ Standard Cost/
 Mean deviation engineer's Mean deviation engineer's K-S test
 Project size cost of cost estimate cost of cost estimate (p-value)
 Small 4.495 4.146 0.022 6.905 6.156 0.033 0.210 (0.000)
 Medium 13.129 9.270 0.028 14.216 10.514 0.031 0.053 (0.109)
 Large 29.503 13.046 0.039 24.215 14.017 0.032 0.231 (0.000)
 Notes: Costs reported in $ 1,000s. The K-S test reports the test statistic and corresponding p-value of a Kolmogorov
 Smirnov test of the equality of the estimated cost distributions within each size category.
 literature (Bajari, Hong, and Stephen Ryan 2010) and suggested magnitudes from
 general construction manuals.24 We also test the equality of the two groups' cost
 of entry distributions. We reject equality for all but one project size category. The
 results of the test are reported in the last column of Table 9.
 V. Counterfactual Analysis
 We use the estimation results to assess the effect of the preferential treatment of
 small firms on participation, the cost to the government, and the probability that
 a project is awarded to a small firm. After a brief overview of the counterfactual
 approach, we first contrast the outcomes of a preference auction under endogenous
 and fixed participation under a range of discount values. This allows us to inves
 tigate whether a bid discount could serve as an effective tool to lower the govern
 ment's cost of procurement or to achieve California's allocative goal. Due to the
 computational cost of numerically deriving equilibrium bidding strategies, we do
 so for select representative projects only. We then study the current program as a
 detailed example of policy effects at a relatively low discount level, before consider
 ing an entry tax or subsidy as a preferential treatment mechanism that targets the
 participation margin directly.
 To compare behavior in alternative environments, we need to derive the appro
 priate bidding strategies that solve the system of differential equations defined by
 the first-order conditions in equation (2). Except for special cases, this system of
 differential equations does not have a closed-form solution and has to be solved
 numerically. We apply and extend the method proposed by Robert C. Marshall et al.
 (1994) to our setting.25
 24Daniel Halpin (2005) and others suggest that estimating costs (cost of time and effort expended to develop a
 total bid price and submit a proposal) typically range between 0.25 percent and 2 percent of the total project cost
 but vary widely depending on the complexity, type of job, and type of work being estimated.
 25Bajari (2001) and Marshall et al. (1994) provide details on numerical solution algorithms for asymmetric
 auctions. Marshall et al. (1994) use polynomial approximations to the cost distributions and employ a forward
 recursive algorithm to solve the resulting set of difference equations with an upper boundary condition. We extend
 their approach as follows. We embed the recursive algorithm in a search routine for a starting point that satisfies the
 upper boundary conditions. We approximate the estimated cost distributions by polynomial splines, which we found
 to produce more stable results than the original Taylor approximations. Finally, we extend their setup in which a
 single asymmetric bidder competes against a second group of bidders to settings with arbitrary numbers of bidders
 within the two groups, which entails solving a larger-dimensional system of differential equations. As in estimation,
 we use Monte Carlo simulation to integrate over the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
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 As a performance check, we initially compare the simulated entry probabilities
 for the 5 percent discount level to the entry probabilities implied by our estimation
 routine. The estimation routine computes expected profits conditional on participa
 tion using the observed bid distributions directly (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
 2000), thus avoiding the simulation step. The simulation routine produces entry
 probabilities that match closely the ones used in estimation. Table A-1 in the online
 Appendix contains a detailed comparison by project category.
 A. The Role of Participation
 We use the numerical routine to simulate auction outcomes under a large set of
 discount values for five typical projects that vary in small and large firms' relative
 project and entry costs. We consider two scenarios; in (i) we hold participation fixed
 at the zero discount level, and in (ii) we allow participation to adjust with the dis
 count level. Figure 2 illustrates for two most typical (yet very dissimilar) types of
 projects the changes that participation adjustments introduce into the relationship
 between the discount and auction outcomes, such as the cost of procurement (or
 the expected winning bid), the small-firm probability of winning, and the expected
 numbers of bidders. Both the probability of small-firm award and the cost of pro
 curement have flatter profiles under fixed than under endogenous participation. The
 fixed participation case isolates the response of bidding strategies to alternative dis
 count levels. With endogenous entry, the bid response is enhanced through a decline
 in large-firm and an increase in small-firm participation associated with increasing
 discounts to small firms. Hence, the probability of small-firm award rises not only
 because a given small bidder's probability of winning increases, but also because
 the proportion of small participants increases.26 In turn, the cost of procurement
 increases as a higher proportion of contracts is awarded to small bidders who charge
 higher prices due to their high costs and the bid discount. The fixed and endogenous
 participation scenarios also differ in their implications for the discount levels needed
 to achieve procurement cost minimization or an allocative goal such as California's.
 As shown in Figure 2, the implications of accounting for endogenous participation
 are quite different for the two projects because they are characterized by different
 degrees of asymmetry between small and large bidders. Project 2 belongs to a group
 of projects where small firms' project and entry costs are very similar to the costs of
 large bidders. In addition, in these projects the variances of the project costs distribu
 tions tend to be lower than for the average project. As a result, a nonnegligible share
 of large bidders is priced out of the auction and chooses not to bid once they observe
 their project cost. This effect, which is significant for this group of projects, largely
 mimics the participation adjustment effect. As a result, the relationships under fixed
 and endogenous participation are similar. Most small projects, and medium rural
 road work projects, share these properties.
 In contrast, project 1 is exemplary of medium and large urban projects where
 small firms are the less efficient group in both entry and project costs. Because of
 26Note that in our counterfactuals, we hold the pool of potential entrants fixed. These results thus do not reflect
 that the discount may change the incentive of a firm of either group to become a potential bidder, which is likely to
 reinforce the latter effect.
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 Figure 2. Expected Cost and Entry under Alternative Bid Discounts, Sample Projects
 substantial asymmetry there is unlikely to be a significant mass of large bidders
 whose bid is beaten by all, including the highest-cost, small bidders. That is why
 the share of large bidders dropping out after observing their project costs is much
 smaller than in the case of project 2. This implies that under fixed participation the
 group of viable bidders does not change very much as the discount level changes.
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 Table 10—bid Preference Program Designs under Alternative Objectives, Sample Projects
 Project
 (Nm,Nlg)
 Project cost differencej_csra —_clg
 Entry cost difference: dsm — dlg
 Cost to the government, Slg = Ssm — 0
 Cost-minimizing policy
 (i) Endogenous entry
 (percent)
 Change in government cost (percent)
 (ii) Entry fixed at 5 = 0-levels
 (6fg,Sl) (percent)
 Change in government cost under fixed entry (percent)
 Change in government cost under endogenous entry
 at SF (percent)
 Policy targeting 25 percent small-firm award rate
 (i) Endogenous entry
 (<5fg.<5fJ (percent)
 Change in government cost (percent)
 (ii) Entry fixed at S = 0-levels
 (<5fe.<5fJ (percent)
 Change in government cost under fixed entry (percent)
 Change in government cost under endogenous entry
 at SF (percent)
 1  2  3  4  5
 (2,3)  (2,4)  (2,4)  (2,4)  (2,5)
 0.50  -0.1  -0.57  0.90  0.30
 0.05  -0.08  0.12  0.10  0.06
 4.75  1.41  9.77  8.61  5.90
 (50,0)  (10,0)  (0,0)  (50,0)  (50,0)
 -2.19  -0.52  0.00  -0.15  -1.28
 (0,20)  (5,0)  (5,0)  (0,15)  (0,10)
 -0.11  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  -0.18
 3.22  0.56  0.05  0.41  1.08
 (0,20)  (0,0)  (0,0)  (0,45)  (0,10)
 3.22  0.00  0.00  2.44  1.08
 (0,50)  (0,0)  (0,0)  (0,75)  (0,50)
 0.23  0.00  0.00  1.05  0.55
 7.82  0.00  0.00  13.180  8.34
 Notes: Costs reported in $100,000s. Change in government cost computed relative to cost under 8lg = 5sm = 0. The
 change in government cost with endogenous entry in the fixed-participation panels measured the cost change that
 results from using S chosen under fixed entry, but allowing participation to respond to the discount. Project 1 is in
 the category of medium urban road-repair work, project 2 in small rural road-repair work, 3 in large urban road
 repair work, 4 in large urban other work, and 5 in medium rural road-repair work.
 B. Cost-Minimizing Discount
 We use the five projects to explore the potential of a bid discount to lower the
 cost of procurement. Table 10 shows that discounts of 5 percent to large bidders
 for projects 2 and 3 minimize government cost under fixed participation since large
 bidders are less efficient for these projects. The model with fixed participation
 prescribes 20 percent, 20 percent and 10 percent discounts to small bidders for
 projects 1, 4, and 5 where small firms have higher project costs. In contrast, the
 cost-minimizing policy that takes participation adjustments into account does not
 generally favor the group with the highest project costs, but reflects entry cost dif
 ferences as well. It implies that very high discounts should be given to large firms
 (which would induce small firms not to participate) on projects 1, 4, and 5; that a
 10 percent discount should be given to large firms on project 2; and that no discount
 should be awarded to either firm group on project 3. It is worth noting that if the
 government followed the prescriptions of the fixed-participation model, the cost
 of procurement would actually increase rather than decrease in four out of the five
 cases after participation adjusts.
 Under the model with participation adjustment the program affects not only bid
 ding behavior but also the composition of bidders. The bid preference generates
 the highest cost savings to the government for projects 1 and 4 where small firms'
 project and entry costs are much higher than the corresponding costs of large firms.
 2678  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  OCTOBER 2011
 In these projects large firms impose substantial competitive pressure on the market.
 In response to a bid discount, the equilibrium participation of large bidders grows,
 and this competitive pressure intensifies, even though the equilibrium participation
 of small bidders declines at the same time. This holds for all large-firm participa
 tion levels that arise in equilibrium under a large-firm bid discount, regardless of the
 magnitude of the discount. The reverse is true if a discount is granted to small firms:
 the associated decline in large-firm equilibrium participation adversely affects the
 competitive intensity despite the increased presence of small firms. It is therefore
 optimal for the government to use the discount to encourage entry by large bidders
 (see the online Appendix for details on the optimal policy for these projects).
 C. Other Discount Levels
 Most preference programs pursue goals other than pure cost minimization and
 therefore are likely to produce procurement cost increases. As Figure 2 indicates,
 such increases can be quite large, ranging for both projects from 1 percent for
 discounts as low as 10 percent to as much as 7 percent with higher discounts of
 40 percent.
 We assess the likely magnitudes of cost increases associated with the preference
 program's objectives using the allocative goal of the California Small Business
 Preference program as an example. The second panel of Table 10 reports the dis
 count rates necessary to achieve this goal and the associated cost increases for the
 five projects discussed earlier. The resulting cost increases range from 0 percent to
 3.2 percent, with the largest increases being associated with projects where small
 bidders are substantially less efficient than large bidders (in either project or entry
 costs). Significantly, the fixed participation model suggests that a much higher (by
 a factor of two) discount level should be used. Choosing this discount level without
 recognizing the changed participation incentives is costly: procurement costs rise by
 approximately 7.8 percent to 13 percent across projects.
 Given the heterogeneity of cost asymmetries across projects in the data, we also
 compute an aggregate measure of the cost of allocating 25 percent of the state's
 procurement load to small firms. We find that a 15 percent discount approximately
 satisfies the aggregate award goal (see Table 11). This results in an approximate
 increase of 1.4 percent in the cost of procurement relative to no government inter
 vention.27 In contrast, if we held participation fixed, we would conclude that a much
 higher discount of 45 percent is needed to achieve the allocative goal. The model
 with fixed participation substantially underestimates the cost increase associated
 with this discount level predicting that the cost would go up by only 1.43 percent.
 This assessment ignores participation effects, which would bring the cost increase
 to 6.6 percent.
 The modest aggregate cost increase for discount levels prescribed by the endog
 enous participation model reflects the composition of projects in the data, which
 27We find 6 that sets, across projects J, £jptmj{S)GovCostj = 0.25£. GovCostj, wherepXj denotes the small
 firm probability of winning auction j. We approximate the probability of winning for each individual project by the
 equivalent for a representative project in its project category (for project categories, see Table 12). We similarly
 approximate the cost of procurement for a given project by the cost for the representative project.
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 Table 11—Effect of Discount Level on Aggregate Procurement Cost
 and Allocation of Work to Small Firms
 (5|*AJ (percent)  Aggregate cost to government Small firms' percent of work
 (25,0)  0.995  3.3
 (15,0)  0.996  4.9
 (10,0)  0.997  7.6
 (5,0)  0.998  10.5
 (0,0)  1.000  12.5
 (0,5)  1.005  15.6
 (0,10)  1.008  20.4
 (0,15)  1.021  31.9
 (0,25)  1.041  44.4
 Note: Cost to the government reported as a percent of the cost under no government intervention.
 contain a significant share of projects where small and large firms have similar costs,
 as in project 2. In these projects small firms are efficient competitors and have a high
 award rate even in the absence of a discount. It seems that the government could
 reduce its cost of procurement even further by granting discounts only for projects
 where small bidders are typically inefficient and thus have low participation and
 award rates.
 D. Evaluation of Current Policy
 Next we turn to an analysis of the bid preference program currently in place in
 California, which uses a relatively low discount of 5 percent. We compare auction
 outcomes in the current environment to the counterfactual setting where the state
 does not use a preference program and instead treats bidders equally. Tables 12 and
 13 contain the results of this analysis. We simulate auction outcomes for a larger
 subset of 119 projects to capture project heterogeneity more finely based on project
 size, location, and type of work.28
 Table 12 reports changes in the cost to the government measured as an expected
 winning bid. The cost to the government does not change very much as a result of
 the preferential treatment of small bidders. While the cost to the government goes up
 in some cases and goes down in others, these effects barely amount to a 0.5 percent
 change for many project categories as well as for most individual projects. At the
 same time, the change is between 1 percent and 2 percent in three out of 11 categories.
 Table 13 compares probabilities of entry by project category. The preferential
 treatment produces the expected increased small-firm and reduced large-firm partic
 ipation. The magnitudes of these effects are economically significant, however, and
 differ substantially across project categories. Small-firm entry probabilities increase
 by between 2 and 7 percentage points, or 2.7 percent and 21 percent, while large
 firm entry probabilities decline by between 3 and 5 percentage points, or 4.4 percent
 and 9.9 percent. The changes in the groups' participation are close to offsetting,
 however: total entry is virtually unchanged across project categories, with increases
 or decreases in overall participation of only approximately 1 percent.
 28Ten projects in each category and all nine projects for large rural other work projects.
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 Table 12—Counterfactual Analysis of Preference Program:
 Comparison of Profit and Government Cost by Project Type
 Average change (percent)
 Project type
 <5Jm = 0  Sm = 0^0.05
 E[nj  E[n,j  E[win bid]  E[nj  E[nIg]  E[win bid]
 Small, rural, road repair/bridge  0.082  0.085  5.004  11.258  -7.831  -0.915
 Medium, rural, road repair/bridge 0.173  0.175  12.095  11.603  -9.527  -0.285
 Large, rural, road repair/bridge  0.257  0.341  13.399  15.752  -7.301  2.357
 Small, urban, road repair/bridge  0.063  0.094  5.800  9.858  -6.822  -0.430
 Medium, urban, road repair/bridge 0.078  0.190  9.819  10.482  -5.560  0.966
 Large, urban, road repair/bridge  0.280  0.337  14.926  14.685  -6.475  1.409
 Small, rural, other work  0.049  0.053  6.460  4.499  -11.499  0.602
 Medium, rural, other work  0.127  0.112  13.026  6.230  -10.065  -0.104
 Small, urban, other work  0.044  0.138  6.140  6.595  -7.805  1.155
 Medium, urban, other work  0.130  0.164  13.930  13.354  -6.389  0.387
 Large, urban, other work  0.239  0.506  15.485  10.072  -9.560  1.620
 Notes: E[IIjm] (E[n,J) denote small (large) firms' expected profits. E[win bid] denotes the expected winning bid,
 which measures the expected cost of procurement to the government. Expected profits and winning bid in $ 100,000s.
 Table 13—counterfactual Analysis of Preference Program:
 Comparison of Predicted Entry by Project Type
 <5Im = 0
 Entry probability  Actual bidders
 Project type  Psm  Pig  Ism  nlg
 Panel A. Entry in the absence of bid discount
 Small, rural, road repair  0.764  0.645  2.255  2.406  4.660
 Medium, rural, road repair  0.600  0.602  2.169  2.574  4.744
 Large, rural, road repair  0.513  0.749  1.036  3.055  4.091
 Small, urban, road repair  0.596  0.671  1.961  2.918  4.879
 Medium, urban, road repair  0.353  0.667  1.649  3.197  4.846
 Large, urban, road repair  0.488  0.737  1.171  3.058  4.229
 Small, rural, other work  0.608  0.498  5.270  1.626  6.896
 Medium, rural, other work  0.530  0.458  4.608  2.499  7.107
 Small, urban, other work  0.530  0.632  2.963  2.416  5.379
 Medium, urban, other work  0.482  0.605  1.783  3.490  5.272
 Large, urban, other work  0.387  0.875  1.522  2.538  4.059
 Average change Ssm - = 0 — 0.05
 Apis  %Apsm  %Apig  %An,
 Panel B. Entry response to introduction of 5 percent bid discount
 Small, rural, road repair  0.030  -0.030  4.175  -5.422  -0.539
 Medium, rural, road repair  0.057  -0.045  9.892  -8.982  -0.320
 Large, rural, road repair  0.072  -0.037  20.971  -6.446  -0.142
 Small, urban, road repair  0.027  -0.028  4.461  -4.408  -0.133
 Medium, urban, road repair  0.037  -0.026  10.294  -4.635  0.620
 Large, urban, road repair  0.062  -0.037  13.861  -5.884  -0.101
 Small, rural, other work  0.017  -0.044  2.893  -9.723  0.192
 Medium, rural, other work  0.027  -0.040  6.002  -9.870  0.746
 Small, urban, other work  0.016  -0.026  2.684  -5.059  0.043
 Medium, urban, other work  0.051  -0.032  11.594  -5.855  0.385
 Large, urban, other work  0.027  -0.031  9.338  -3.832  0.967
 Notes: psm (pig) denote small (large) firms' entry probabilities. tilg, and n, denote the
 expected number of small, large, and total bidders, respectively. A denotes absolute changes in
 going from Ssm = 0 to S,m = 0.05, while %A denotes percentage changes. Road repair includes
 bridge work.
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 Table 14—counterfactual Analysis of Preference Program:
 Change in Small-Firm Award Rates by Project Type
 Average change Ssm = 0 —♦ 0.05
 Fixed entry Endog. entry
 Small, rural, road repair/bridge  0.0237  0.0482
 Medium, rural, road repair/bridge  0.0223  0.0625
 Large, rural, road repair/bridge  0.0166  0.0581
 Small, urban, road repair/bridge  0.0185  0.0386
 Medium, urban, road repair/bridge  0.0145  0.0424
 Large, urban, road repair/bridge  0.0149  0.0460
 Small, rural, other work  0.0188  0.0421
 Medium, rural, other work  0.0193  0.0512
 Small, urban, other work  0.0181  0.0402
 Medium, urban, other work  0.0182  0.0538
 Large, urban, other work  0.0146  0.0372
 Notes: Column 2 shows the average percentage point change in the small-firm probability of
 winning when entry is held fixed at the level under Ssm = 0. Column 3 shows percentage point
 changes when entry is allowed to adjust to the bid discount.
 The participation effects contribute significantly to the increase in small firms'
 probabilities of winning. As Table 14 shows, the change in probability of winning
 under endogenous participation is twice the change generated by the discount only
 (under fixed participation). Finally, the program also increases small potential bid
 der's expected profit prior to participating by 5 percent to 16 percent, with an aver
 age of 10.4 percent, while decreasing large firms' profits by 5 percent to 12 percent,
 with an average of 8 percent (see Table 12). The preferential treatment thus results
 in a nontrivial redistribution of profits from large to small firms at almost no cost to
 the government.
 The changes in entry and profits differ substantially in magnitude across project
 types. Two potential sources of such differences are (i) variation in cost asymme
 tries and (ii) differences in market thickness, or the number of potential bidders.
 We investigate how these factors affect the magnitude of the program's impact on
 small bidders' participation in Table 15. The table reports the results of an OLS
 projection of the absolute change in small bidders' probability of entry on project
 characteristics, potential entry, and the moments of the two groups' entry and proj
 ect cost distributions.
 The results suggest that small-firm participation responds more strongly for larger
 projects, for projects where small firms have lower average project costs than large
 firms, and for projects where the within-group variation in entry costs is lower, in par
 ticular for large firms. Last, the program has stronger effects for projects with fewer
 small potential bidders, but a higher number of large potential bidders. These effects
 are intuitive. Larger projects produce a larger absolute gain from the program that
 offsets entry costs. Low variance of the entry cost distribution implies that a given
 change in expected profit from participating affects the entry behavior of a larger
 mass of firms. The number of potential bidders reflects the competitive intensity and
 the size of the set over which the program's profit gains or losses are divided.
 The second specification in Table 15 shows that after controlling for small firms'
 base probability of entry at 5 = 0, only project costs and potential competition play
 a statistically significant, now larger, role in promoting participation. The results
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 Table 15—analysis of the Magnitude of Counterfactual Effects:
 Small Firms' Entry Response
 Coefficient
 Standard
 error  Coefficient
 Standard
 error
 csm  0.0450***  0.0091  0.0610***  0.0110
 CIg CSm  0.0590***  0.0110  0.0800***  0.0140
 ^sm  1.3700***  0.4200  0.7440  0.5800
 a
 ® sm  -8.8200***  3.6300  -4.6600  3.9200
 G G
 alg ~ a sm  -19.1600***  8.3100  -12.1900  8.5400
 Number of small plan holders  -0.0020***  0.0006  -0.0030***  0.0006
 Number of large plan holders  0.0051***  0.0008  0.0050***  0.0007
 Psm(t>sm = 0)  -0.0340***  0.1400
 Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the probability of entry for small firms. c,g and
 c„„ denote large and small firms' mean projects costs; dsm denote small firms' mean entry
 costs, cr,g and <rfm denote the standard deviation of large and small firms' entry costs; and
 Psm(6sm — 0) denotes the small-firm probability of entry under S,,„ = 0.
 also indicate that gains in small-firm participation are larger in projects where their
 participation would have been low in the absence of preferential treatment. The
 program thus appears to be more effective for projects where participation of small
 firms is impeded without preferential treatment.
 This analysis is related to Marion (2007) who provides an alternative estimate
 of the effect of the California Small Business Preference program on the cost of
 procurement. He measures this effect by comparing a set of state-funded projects
 where the program is implemented to a set of federally funded projects. He finds
 that the average winning bid on state-funded projects exceeds that on federally
 funded projects by 3.8 percent. Attributing this difference to the program is com
 plicated by the fact that federally funded projects have another preferential treat
 ment program in place that restricts bidders' subcontracting choices. In addition,
 federally and state-funded projects differ along observable dimensions, suggesting
 that they may also differ on unobservable characteristics that would affect firms'
 cost distributions and, thus, the magnitudes of the effects of a preference program.
 If this were the case, the observed difference in participation patterns between the
 two sets of auctions would similarly not represent the changes in participation
 brought forth by the program.
 E. Subsidy
 Our analysis so far shows that increases in small-firm participation translate
 into increases in the group's probability of project award. This additional effect
 is often stronger than the direct effect of the discount, which works though the
 change in bidding strategies. Our analysis further suggests that differences in bid
 preparation costs contribute significantly to the difference in participation rates
 across bidder groups. Hence, a direct entry subsidy of small firms (or tax of large
 firms) could alternatively help to achieve small-firm award goals. A subsidy would
 increase the cost of procurement to the government, whereas a tax may reduce
 government outlays.
 Table 16 summarizes lump-sum subsidy or tax policies that achieve alternative
 government goals for the five sample projects discussed above. We find that the
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 Table 16—comparison of Alternative Subsidy Programs, Sample Proiects
 Project
 1  2  3  4  5
 Optimal subsidy
 Government cost  4.23  1.3  9.14  8.14  5.51
 A Government cost (percent)  -8.93  -7.10  -7.97  -5.60  -5.95
 Subsidy—small  -0.20  -0.10  -0.80  -0.30  -0.20
 —large  -0.20  -0.20  -1.31  -0.30  -0.20
 Expected number of bidders—small  0.00  1.96  1.96  0.00  0.00
 —large  2.55  0.00  0.00  3.01  3.14
 Subsidy targeting small-firm probability of winning
 Case 1
 A Government cost (percent)  -4.57  -7.59  -7.97  -0.75  -3.04
 A Large-firm profit (percent)  -100  -100  -100  -100  -100
 Subsidy—small  -0.40  -0.10  -0.81  -0.81  -0.61
 —large  -0.90  -0.20  -1.31  -1.72  -1.02
 Case 2
 A Government cost (percent)  13.83  0.00  0.00  9.89  11.14
 A Large-firm profit (percent)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 Subsidy—small  0.30  0.00  0.00  0.30  0.30
 —large  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.10
 Benchmarks
 Government cost (minimum)  4.65  1.40  9.93  8.62  5.85
 Government cost (allocation target)  4.90  1.41  9.93  8.85  5.95
 Notes: The subsidy amounts denote a subsidy payment to an individual firm were it to enter,
 with negative amounts denoting a tax. Government cost and subsidy payments in $100,000s.
 Case 1 shows subsidy levels that produce a 25 percent probability of winning for small firms.
 Case 2 displays subsidy levels which achieve that same small firm probability of winning as
 above but also constrain large-firm profits to be at least as large as those under a bid discount
 with a 25 percent small-firm probability of winning. The changes in costs and expected profits
 are computed relative to the respective magnitudes under the above bid discount.
 unconstrained cost-minimizing policy (panel 1) involves taxing both groups.29 It
 reflects the trade-off between tax rate and tax base: higher tax rates increase per-firm
 tax receipts, but lower participation, putting upward pressure on the expected win
 ning bid. The government minimizes its cost of procurement by choosing tax rates
 so only the more efficient group participates in bidding, where efficiency reflects
 both project and entry costs. Participation is reduced relative to the no-intervention
 case; yet the cost of procurement decreases due to the tax receipts. For a detailed,
 graphical example of the relationship between the tax and the total cost of procure
 ment, see Figure A-5 in the online Appendix.
 We next turn to a policy that achieves California's goal of allocating 25 percent
 of procurement dollars to small firms (see panel 2 of Table 16). A subsidy to small
 firms that achieves this objective is less costly to the government than the equivalent
 bid discount. It realizes cost savings of 0.7 percent to 8 percent relative to a bid dis
 count that achieves the same small-firm award rate. These cost savings are realized
 in part by taxing large firms and come at the cost of that group's profits.
 29 With high tax levels, participation may drop to zero, resulting in a nonaward of the project. The true economic
 cost of a nonaward and later readvertising of a possibly rescoped project is difficult to estimate. We assume, how
 ever, that it exceeds the cost of awarding the project immediately. In our simulations, we simply set the govern
 ment's cost in this case equal to the particular project's engineer's estimate, an amount that across projects exceeds
 the minimum cost to the government.
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 Such high penalties on large firms may be undesirable. We compare instead the
 cost of tax/subsidy policies and bid discounts that both achieve the small-firm award
 goals and entail identical, less severely reduced, large-firm profit levels. In both
 cases, we allow large-firm profit to decline to the amount associated with the bid dis
 count under the allocative goal. Interestingly, we find that under these constraints,
 a tax/subsidy policy results in higher cost of procurement for all five projects (see
 panel 3 in Table 16). This result highlights an unexpected benefit associated with
 bid preference programs: they limit profit redistribution given a target probability of
 winning for the preferred group. Bid preference programs are designed to artificially
 increase the probability of winning of the preferred group, an effect that is further
 enhanced by the participation responses to the program. In the absence of such a
 mechanism, the tax/subsidy policy has to increase the probability of winning solely
 through increases in the preferred group's participation. For a given preferred-group
 probability of winning, the participation responses are necessarily more significant
 than under the bid discount. This, in turn, reduces the nonpreferred group's profit
 margins below the level associated with the bid discount program. To achieve a tar
 get probability of winning while holding large-firm profit at the corresponding bid
 preference level, the government has to subsidize the participation of both small and
 large firms.30 These subsidy expenditures offset the cost reductions brought about
 by the increased participation.
 VI. Conclusion
 This paper provides evidence based on the California Small Business Preference
 program on the channels through which bid discounts affect procurement outcomes,
 separating adjustments in firms' participation behavior from those in their bidding
 decisions. Within our empirical context, we find that the response in firms' bid
 ding behavior (conditional on participation) to alternative discount levels changes
 aggregate procurement costs by only a limited amount relative to more substantial
 changes resulting from participation adjustments. This is of critical importance to
 policy design; we show, for example, that taking firms' participation incentives into
 account alters the bid discounts that achieve the government's procurement goals
 and the assessment of the costs increases associated with different discount levels.
 California's current program generates only small increases in procurement costs.
 While promoting small-firm participation at the expense of large-firm participation
 and profit, it does not achieve the state's allocative goal. Our results imply that for
 the set of projects in our data, a higher discount of 15 percent is needed to reach
 the allocative target. This discount level does not come at substantial cost increases,
 however, raising the aggregate cost of procurement by 1.4 percent relative to no
 intervention. It is important to note that these results depend crucially on the mix
 of projects in California's highway procurement market. In other markets allocative
 goals may lead to larger or smaller cost increases.
 30 A subsidy may provide incentives for firms to submit uncompetitive bids for the sole purpose of collecting
 subsidy payments. Instead, the subsidy could be awarded only to the winning bidder, while a tax can be applied to
 all entrants from the taxed group. The subsidy level has to be adjusted to account for this modification. The magni
 tudes of all effects remain unchanged.
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 We consider the cost implications of broader policy redesign. In line with theo
 retical predictions for environments with fixed participation, we find that a bid dis
 count can be used to lower the government's cost of procurement. If the degree of
 cost asymmetries between small and large firms is high, the cost-minimizing auction
 design prevents the inefficient group—typically small firms—from participating by
 granting a large discount to the other group. Since projects where small firms are
 very inefficient are easily identifiable by observable attributes, the government may
 prefer to use the set-aside auctions common in the timber industry in such instances.
 In our dataset, however, even the cost-minimizing discount generates only modest
 cost reductions, while discounts that depart from this level—but remain within the
 range of typically used bid discounts—can result in significant cost increases for at
 least a subset of projects.
 We find large heterogeneity in the effect of the bid discount across types of proj
 ects. This suggests that the government should optimally employ a more nuanced
 preferential treatment, tailoring the discount rate to the project type, similar to the
 approach taken by the FCC. This can result in substantial cost savings while facili
 tating the implementation of the state's allocative goals.
 Our findings suggest further that a lump-sum entry fee is more effective than a bid
 discount at reducing the cost of procurement. This reduction in government cost is
 achieved at the expense of large bidders whose profit margins are significantly reduced.
 In contrast, for a given allocative goal and large-firm profit levels, a tax/subsidy policy
 drives the cost to the government above the level attained by a bid preference program.
 Our results demonstrate that a preference program evaluation depends critically
 on capturing firms' participation responses to the policy. While our findings are
 based on the highway procurement market, we believe that this insight, as well as
 our technique for predicting participation responses, is pertinent to other auction
 markets where discriminatory policies are used. A number of open questions remain.
 We focus on the short-run effects of the program but do not assess its dynamic, long
 run implications. This includes adjustments to the set of potential bidders, which we
 hold fixed throughout our analysis. Due to the complexities of analyzing asymmet
 ric auctions in a dynamic game, we also do not formally consider the importance of
 capacity constraints that could affect project costs and thus both bids and participa
 tion incentives. Following Caltrans' current practice, we do not introduce a reserve
 price into our analysis. Similar to the bid discount, a reserve price limits the partici
 pation of favored and nonfavored bidders with high project costs. At the same time,
 it induces favored firms to bid more aggressively than under the bid discount alone,
 thus limiting the redistribution of profits to favored firms. This raises a number of
 interesting issues, including the optimal policy design in the presence of possibly
 group-specific reserve prices and the importance of participation responses in the
 optimal policy. We leave these to future research.
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